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UPSTAGING THE PLAYWRIGHT: THE JOINT
AUTHORSHIP ENTANGLEMENT BETWEEN
DRAMATURGS AND PLAYWRIGHTS*
I. INTRODUCTION
Jonathan Larson's musical Rent has been an astounding critical, artis-
tic, and commercial success since its Broadway debut in 1996.1 Rent, a
modem version of the classic La Boheme, depicts New York Bohemians
struggling with AIDS. 2 In addition to Larson's contribution as the play-
wright, several collaborators helped to develop the musical.3 These collabo-
rators included the artistic director of the New York Theater Workshop
4
("NYTW"), the show's director, and Lynn Thomson, the dramaturg'
During the musical's debut, Thomson filed a lawsuit against the play-
wright, Larson.6 Thomson claimed that she was a joint author of Rent, and
was therefore entitled to sixteen percent of the royalties, which is an esti-
mated annual sum of $250,000 . Shining a rare spotlight on the dramaturg,
this suit presented the Second Circuit with the novel issue of whether a
dramaturg can rely on copyright law to claim a share of a play's royalties.8
* This Comment won first place in the 1998 I.H. Prinzmetal Competition for Entertainment
Law, sponsored by the Beverly Hills Bar Association.
1. Greg Evans, Judge Takes Larson Side in 'Rent' Suit, DAILY VARIETY, July 24, 1997, at 1.
Rent has routinely grossed more than $500,000 a week since its opening. Id. at 11. Winning four
Tony awards and the Pulitzer Prize, Rent has become a critical success. Prime Time Live: One
Song Glory - Jonathan Larson Death (ABC television broadcast, July 10, 1996) (transcript on file
with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal) [hereinafter Prime Time Live].
2. Prime Time Live, supra note 1.
3. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 197-98 (2d Cir. 1998). Afier the show's final dress
rehearsal before the off-Broadway opening, Larson died of an aortic aneurysm. Id.
4. Before its Broadway production, Rent was produced as an off-Broadway production by the
New York Theater Workshop. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 197.
5. One who specializes in the "art or technique of dramatic composition." WEBSTER'S NINTH
NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 381 (9th ed. 1988). See infra Part II.A.
6. Greg Evans, Court Evicts Lawsuit Over 'Rent' Control, DAILY VARIETY, July 28-Aug. 3,
1997, at 63.
7. Id. Thomson was paid $2,000 in 1995 for her dramaturgical services. Lawsuit Dismissed
for 'Rent' Royalties, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 25, 1997, at 4. Currently, she receives fifty
dollars a week through an agreement with the show's Broadway producers. Patti Hartigan, Wolf-
song's Tales offHis Journey Home, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 6, 1996, at C7.
8. Robert Simonson 'Rent' Dramaturg Sues Larson Estate, BACKSTAGE, Dec. 6, 1996, at I;
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Ruling in favor of the Larson estate, the court deemed the playwright sole
author of Rent.9 This decision not only raised legal questions regarding the-
atrical collaboration,10 but thrust the theater world into a divisive debate
over the dramaturg's role in theater.1
This Comment examines why a dramaturg cannot be deemed a joint
author of a play under prevailing copyright law. Part II explores the
dramaturg's role in theater and common law treatment of joint works under
the 1909 Copyright Act. 2 Additionally, Part II focuses on the definition of
"joint works" under the current 1976 Copyright Act.' 3 Part III establishes
the current approach to identify joint authors and discusses case law that
applies this test. This Part also assesses why the Second Circuit in Thom-
son v. Larson correctly applied the prevailing joint authorship test. Finally,
Part IV scrutinizes the shortcomings of this test and establishes that contract
law is better suited than copyright law to protect the dramaturg, especially in
the realm of new play development.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Dramaturg 's Emergence in American Theater
Although the dramaturg originated in eighteenth century Germany,14 it
did not become a visible force in American theater until fifteen years ago."
The dramaturg's role in American theater is amorphous 16 and overlaps with
that of other artists.' 7 A consensus has never been reached on the drama-
turg's function in theater.'8 Typically, dramaturgs assist directors and
see Evans, supra note 1, at 1.
9. Lawsuit Dismissed for 'Rent' Royalties, supra note 7, at 4.
10. Ralph Blumenthal, Memory Falters in Lawsuit for 'Rent' Royalties, N.Y. TIMEs, July
23, 1997, at B2.
11. Evans, supra note 6, at 61.
12. 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1978).
13. 17 U.S.C § 101 (1994).
14. Telephone Interview with Mandy Mishelle, Literary Manager, New York Theater Work-
shop, New York, N.Y. (Sept. 12, 1997); see also Hartigan, supra note 7, at C7 (stating that the
first recognized dramaturg was Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, a German playwright who the Ham-
burg National Theater hired in 1767 to write essays for the theater's productions).
15. Simonson, supra note 8, at 1.
16. Nelson Pressley, Dramaturg's Legal Lament about 'Rent', WASH. TIMEs, Aug. 24,
1997, at D2.
17. Jan Stuart, On Theater: Who Do Ya Call if Turgenev Gets Turgid?, NEWSDAY, Aug. 3,
1997, at C16.
18. Pressley, supra note 16, at D2.
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playwrights. 9 As a director's aid, a dramaturg contributes research and
writes the descriptive essays for the show's program.2" For example, if a
play is set in a particular nation or certain period of history, the dramaturg's
job involves checking pronunciations and period authenticity. 21 In this re-
spect, the dramaturg's duties overlap with those of the director, set designer,
and speech consultant.22 As a playwright's assistant, the dramaturg offers
script suggestions to strengthen the story, characters, and theme. 23 This as-
sistance is similar to editing and can even include rewriting scenes or dia-
logue. 24
The dramaturg's emergence in American theater correlated with the
rise of regional theater, which focused on developing and creating new
plays. 25  The more collaborative this process became, the more likely each
collaborator's voice was heard, including the dramaturg's. 26 After stabiliz-
ing and becoming entirely professional, regional theaters introduced Ameri-
can theater to areas outside New York.27 These off-off Broadway compa-
nies conducted developmental workshops to create original plays. 28 During
the 1960s, the Open Theater, a well-known off-off Broadway company, en-
couraged playwrights to supply outlines of scenes to actors who later devel-
oped the dialogue through improvisation.29  Today, many theaters have
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Stuart, supra note 17, at C16.
22. Id.
23. Pressley, supra note 16, at D2.
24. Stuart, supra note 17, at C16.
25. See Simonson, supra note 8, at 1.
26. Telephone Interview with Mandy Mishelle, supra note 14 (stating that theater has in-
cluded an element of collaboration for several centuries). In the sixteenth century, theaters in Italy
developed an art form called cominedia deli'arte which became popular throughout Europe. See
OscAR G. BROCKETT, HISTORY OF THEATRE 147 (6th ed. 1991). Traveling troupes of actors per-
formed commedia dell'arte, light-hearted stories often involving physical comedy. See id. Im-
provisation is a fundamental characteristic of cormnedia dell'arte, requiring the actors to work
only from a plot outline instead of a finished script. Id. at 148. Thus, collaboration or ensemble
acting was essential to this art form because no one actor could be sure what the others would say
or do. Id. Commnedia dell'arte has influenced the development of American theater as well. See
id.
27. BROCKETT, supra note 26, at 574. In the 1940s, high production costs and the rising
popularity of television resulted in the development of only a small number of Broadway produc-
tions. Id. at 571. In response, the off-Broadway movement burgeoned and inspired productions
requiring lower production costs. See id. These economic pressures subsided by the 1960s, al-
lowing off-Broadway theaters to produce more conventional shows. Id. at 573. Consequently, off-
off Broadway productions became more experimental and efforts to decentralize theater grew. Id.
at 573-74.
28. BROCKETT, supra note 26, at 622-23.
29. Id. at 623.
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similar workshop programs where new plays are developed through the
combined efforts of playwrights, actors, directors, and dramaturgs.3° Ameri-
can theater continues to embrace the communal spirit.31 There are many
more "midwives in the birth of a play" than there were twenty years ago
when the musical A Chorus Line was conceived through collaborative ef-
forts.
32
B. The Constitutional Purpose of Copyright Law
The United States Constitution provides that Congress shall have
power. . . "To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries. 33 In accordance with the Constitution,
the general purpose of copyright legislation is to encourage learning. 4
Granting limited exclusive rights to authors is a means of achieving this
goal.
35
C. The History of Joint Works: The 1909 Copyright Act
The 1909 Copyright Act does not expressly refer to joint works or joint
authorship.36 Hence, case law has established the joint works principle.37 In
Levy v. Rutley,38 a joint work was first defined as "a joint laboring in fur-
therance of a common design." 39 This definition was broadly applied in sub-
30. Telephone Interview with Mandy Mishelle, supra note 14.
31. Stuart, supra note 17, at C16.
32. Id. In A Chorus Line, the cast of thirty-seven dancers gave testimonials that provided the
basis for the show's story. Id. Because the cast contributed significantly to the musical's devel-
opment, the playwright agreed to give the cast one-half of one percent of A Chorus Line's gross
profits as well as a portion of the subsidiary income. Id.
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (providing that the goal of copyright legislation is to en-
courage the creation of works for the public by promoting the "Progress of Science and useful
Arts"); see also Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the objective of the Act is "not to reward an author for her labors, but 'to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts"').
35. ROBERT A. GORMAN & JANE C. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE NINETtES 15 (4th ed.
1993). A legislative report on the Copyright Act stated that the enactment of copyright legislation
was not based upon any natural right an author has in her writings but rather focused on protect-
ing the public's welfare. See H.R. REP. No. 60-2222, at 1 (1909).
36. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 6.01, at 6-3 n. 1 (1998).
37. Id. § 6.01, at 6-3 n.1. The 1909 Copyright Act implicitly acknowledges that a copyright
renewal can be jointly owned by more than one person, such as the author's children, executors, or
next of kin. Copyright Act of 1909, § 24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81 (repealed 1978).
38. 6 L.R.-C.P. 523, 529 (Eng. 1871).
39. Id. at 529; see also Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140 F.2d
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sequent federal cases involving copyright protection under the 1909 Act.4
In the time period between the enactment of the 1909 and 1976 Acts, cases
generally involved conflicts between composers and lyricists. 1
At common law, a joint work was found even when two authors did
not work together, did not make their contributions during the same period,
and did not know each other.4 ' The Second Circuit in Edward B. Marks
Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co. 43 supports this broad interpretation
of joint works." The Marks court held that for a joint work to exist, "it
makes no difference whether the authors work in concert, or even whether
they know each other; it is enough that they mean their contributions to be
complementary in the sense that they are to be embodied in a single work to
be performed as such." '" In Marks, a lyricist wrote the original words for
unwritten music.4 The lyricist's publisher subsequently employed a com-
poser to write the music.47 The court determined that the resulting song was
a joint work because the lyricist intended his words to be set to music.
48
Likewise, the composer understood that he was composing for particular
lyrics.49
Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,50 also known as
the Melancholy Baby case,5 extended the holding from Marks.52 In the
Melancholy Baby case, a composer created the music and his wife wrote the
lyrics5 3 Because the publisher only sought to use the composer's music, he
obtained the composer's consent to hire a new lyricist.54 Therefore, the Sec-
266, 267 (2d Cir. 1944), modified, 140 F.2d 268 (quoting Levy, 6 L.R.-C.P. at 529 (establishing
one of the first common law definitions ofjoint authorship)).
40. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955),
modified on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music
Co., 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946); Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 140 F.2d at 267; Maurel v.
Smith, 220 F. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), affd, 271 F. 211 (2d Cir. 1921).
41. Susan Keller, Collaboration in Theater: Problems and Copyright Solutions, 33
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 891, 895 (1986); see also Maurel, 220 F. at 203 (holding that the composer and
lyricist working on the opera book were joint authors).
42. 1 NIMMER & NnuERi, supra note 36, § 6.03, at 6-7.
43. 140 F.2d at 266 (2d. Cir. 1944), modified 140 F.2d 268 (2d. Cir. 1944).
44. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 140 F.2d at 267; see also 1 NIMMER & NIMvER, supra
note 37, § 6.03, at 6-7.
45. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 140 F.2d at 267.
46. 1d. at 266.
47. Id.
48. 1d. at 267.
49. id.
50. 161 F.2d 406 (2d Cir. 1946).
51. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.03, at 6-8.
52. Id.
53. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 161 F.2d at 407.
54. Id at 408.
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ond Circuit held that the composer of the music and the second lyricist were
joint authors of the resulting song.5" The Melancholy Baby case is signifi-
cant because it held that a person chosen to re-write a song's original lyrics
56can be deemed a joint author with the original composer.
The Second Circuit went even further in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v.
Jerry Vogel Music Co., 57 known as the Twelfth Street Rag case.58 In this
case, the composer created a popular piano solo, which he did not intend to
be accompanied by lyrics.59 The composer later assigned his rights in the
composition to a publisher, who then hired a lyricist. 60 The court deemed
the resulting piece to be a joint work of the lyricist and composer. 61 Thus,
this case radically extended the joint work doctrine in two ways.62 First, the
court held that the requisite intent could be established by the author's as-
signee instead of the author. 63  Second, it held that intent can be subse-
quently established by the author or their assignee, regardless of the author's
original opposite intent.' 4
D. Joint Works under the 1976 Copyright Act
1. Rejecting the Twelfth Street Rag Doctrine
By enacting the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress created a narrower
definition of joint works, and rejected the application of the Twelfth Street
Rag doctrine to works created on or after January 1, 1978.65 Under the
1976 Act, in order to be considered a joint work, authors must intend for
55. Id at 409.
56. Id.
57. 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir. 1955), modifiedon reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
58. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.03, at 6-9.
59. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co., 221 F.2d at 570.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 1 NIMMER & NMMER, supra note 36, § 6.03, at 6-9.
63. Id.
64. Id Before the enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act, a case known as the Three Little
Pigs modified the Twelfth Street Rag Doctrine. See Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, Inc., 314 F.
Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aJfd on other grounds, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir. 1972); 1 NIMRER &
NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.03, at 6-9. Faced with a conflict similar to the one presented in the
Twelfth Street Rag case, the court in the Three Little Pigs did not find joint authorship because the
songwriters did not make a "more substantial and significant contribution" to the original work.
Picture Music, Inc., 314 F. Supp. at 647.
65. 1 NIMffiR & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.06[A], at 6-17 n.3. The 1976 Act became ef-
fective on January 1, 1978. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (Supp. 1996). Thus, the
1909 Act still governs works created through December 31, 1977. See id.
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their contributions to merge into a common whole.66 The legislative history
of the 1976 Act also emphasizes how essential the authors' intent is to the
creation of a joint work.67 By requiring that a contribution be made with
such knowledge and intent, the legislative history rejected the Twelfth Street
Rag doctrine which recognized a joint work even if an author did not have
the intent to create one.68
In accordance with the legislative history of the 1976 Act, composers
who hope to set lyrics to their music do not have the requisite intent to es-
tablish a joint work with the eventual lyricist.69 This is because the compos-
ers do not know if lyrics will in fact be written for their music. 70 Similarly,
playwrights are not deemed co-authors of a motion picture that is based on
their work, unless they collaborated with the studio or screenwriter when
they wrote the play. 1
Although the legislative history of the 1976 Act expressly abandoned
the Twelfth Street Rag doctrine, it has not expressly rejected the Melancholy
Baby case.72 Nevertheless, the legislative history provides that co-authors
are required to intend at the time the work is created that their respective
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). A joint work is defined as "a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole." Id.; see also infra Part II.D.2 (defining joint work).
67. S. REP. No. 94-473, at 103 (1975). "The touchstone here is intention at the time the
writing is done, that the parts be absorbed or combined into an integrated unit." 1d. (emphasis
added); see also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at 280.
68. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976); GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at
280.
69. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at 281.
70. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120; see GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at 281.
71. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (stating that "although a novelist, playwright, or song-
writer may write a work with the hope... that [their] work will be used in a motion picture, this is
clearly a case of separate or independent authorship rather than one where the basic intention be-
hind the writing of the work was for motion picture use."); see also GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra
note 35, at 280. It is unclear which joint works rule applies to works created before January 1,
1978. See COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PT. 1, REPORT OF THE REGISTRAR OF COPYRIGHT ON THE
GENERAL REVISION OF U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 87TH CONG., 1st Sess. at 90. (1961) [hereinafter
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION]; 1 NIMMER & NIivimER, supra note 36, § 6.06, at 6-17 n.3. However,
potential constitutional problems preclude the 1976 Act from being applied retroactively. See
GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at 271. To illustrate, under the Twelfth Street Rag Doc-
trine, if a composer writes a song without intending to set it to lyrics, a joint work is still created if
a lyricist later writes lyrics for that song. See Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co.,
221 F.2d 569, 570 (2d. Cir. 1955), modifiedon reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d. Cir. 1955). If the 1976
Act were applied retroactively, each artist would only own their respective contribution rather than
owning an equal and undivided interest in the whole song. This scenario could raise constitutional
issues if the taking occurred without just compensation. GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at
271.
72. See 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.03, at 6-8.
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contributions be merged. 73  In the Melancholy Baby case, when the com-
poser first wrote the music, he did not intend for his composition to accom-
pany lyrics written by a second lyricist.74 Therefore, the holding in the Mel-
ancholy Baby case is not compatible with the legislative history of the 1976
Act.
2. Defining Joint Work
The 1976 Copyright Act defines a "joint work" as "a work prepared
by two or more authors 75 with the intention that their contributions be
merged into inseparable76 or interdependent 77 parts of a unitary whole. 78
73. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (stating that the "touchstone ... is the intention, at the
time the writing is done.").
74. See Shapiro, Bernstein, & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 161 F.2d 406, 410 (2d Cir.
1946). But see COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, supra note 71, at 90 (indicating that The Register of
Copyright "would not go as far as the theory of the Twelfth Street Rag decision, but would adopt
the test laid down by the earlier line of cases.").
75. The 1976 Copyright Act states that "copyright protection subsists.., in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). Works of
authorship include the following categories: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, including any
accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any accompanying music; (4) pantomimes
and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and
other audiovisual works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works. Id. The Act intention-
ally did not define "original works of authorship." H.R. RP. No. 94-1476, at 51. Instead, the Act
incorporated the standard established by the courts interpreting the 1909 Act. Id. at 51-52. The
Supreme Court has defined "author" as "he to whom anything owes its origin" in Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884), and as "the party who actually creates the
work" in Communityfor Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989). Subsequent
case law has indicated that an original work of authorship requires an "extremely low" level of
creativity. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (stating
that "[o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently cre-
ated by the author (as opposed to copied from other works) and that it possesses at least some
minimal degree of creativity."); see also 1 NAMNER & NnvovffiR, supra note 36, § 1.08 [C][1] at 1-
66.28 (explaining that "originality does not signify novelty"). As long as the work is created inde-
pendently, neither novelty nor aesthetic merit are required to establish originality. H.R. REP. No.
94-1476, at 51.
76. A part is inseparable if it is absorbed or combined into an integrated unit, although the
part has little meaning standing alone. Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120. For example, the chapters of a novel or colors in a painting
have little meaning when standing alone, but are inseparable when absorbed or combined into an
integrated unit. Id.
77. A part is interdependent when the portion has meaning standing alone but achieves its
significance because of the combination of those interdependent parts. Childress, 945 F.2d at 505.
The lyrics and music of a song for example, are interdependent parts of a unitary whole. H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 120; see also Childress, 945 F.2d at 505.
78. The legislative history provides examples of works constituting interdependent and in-
separable parts of a unitary whole, however, these works are not expressly defined. See H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, at 120.
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This definition of a joint work also implicitly defines joint authorship. 79
However, the concept of a joint work is broader than that of joint authorship
because not all joint works are necessarily products of joint authorship.80
The 1976 Act also requires that "authors of a joint work [be] co-owners of
copyright in the work."'" Thus, joint owners of a work hold equal and undi-
vided interests in that work."2 Each joint author has the right to use or li-
cense the work as long as they please, as long as they share the profits with
the other joint authors.8 3
3. The Ambiguous Meaning of Intent
The legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act mentions that "a
work is 'joint' if the authors collaborated with each other, or if each of the
authors prepared their contribution with the knowledge and inten[t]ion that it
would be merged with the contributions of other authors as 'inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole."'84 This passage implies that either
the act of collaboration alone, or the authors' knowledge and intent to merge
their contributions will create a joint work. 85
The 1976 Act's legislative history is inconsistent with its plain lan-
guage because the legislative history allows a joint work to result from the
authors' mere collaboration rather than an intent to merge their contribu-
tions.86 In fact, the statute states that joint authors must create their work
while knowing that it will be merged into a whole.8 7  The "collaboration
79. Childress, 945 F.2d at 505; 1 NIMMER & NIMvMER, supra note 36, § 6.01, at 6-3.
80. 1 NIMvER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.01, at 6-3. As Nimmer explains:
A joint work will result under ... the following circumstances: (1) if the work is a
product of joint authorship; (2) if the author or copyright proprietor transfers such
copyright to more than one person; (3) if the author or copyright proprietor transfers
an undivided interest in such copyright to one or more persons, reserving to himself
an undivided interest; (4) if upon the death of the author or copyright proprietor,
such copyright passes by will or intestacy to more than one person; (5) if the renewal
rights under the Copyright Act or the terminated rights under the termination of
transfer provisions, vest in a class consisting of more than one person; [and] (6) if
the work is subject to state community property laws.
Id. at 6-3, 6-4.
81. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994); see also Childress, 945 F.2d at 505.
82. See generally Childress, 945 F.2d at 505; 17 U.S.C. §201 (providing details of what
constitutes an undivided interest).
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994).
84. S. REP. No. 94-473, at 103 (1975).
85. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress, 945
F.2d at 505.
86. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1068.
87. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (describing a joint work as a "work
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged").
1998]
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alone" standard implied by the legislative history discourages an author from
writing because mere editorial comments by third parties could divest the
author of sole authorship.8 Authors will avoid such collaboration because it
can result in joint authorship and, thus, authors will have a reduced incentive
to create. 9 This standard for joint authorship frustrates the goal of the Con-
stitution's copyright clause.9°
4. Joint Works v. Derivative and Collective Works
It is important to distinguish joint works from derivative9' and collec-
tive works.92 A derivative work consists of inseparable parts, but does not
require the authors to intend to create a joint work. 93 For example, a deriva-
tive work is created when an author's contribution results in the adaptation
or transformation of another author's original work, such as a sequel to a
film.94 A collective work is similar to a derivative work in that the authors
lack an intent to create a joint work.95 The main difference between the two
is that a collective work contains interdependent parts assembling several
different authors' works into a collective whole,96 such as an anthology or
encyclopedia.97
Distinguishing a joint work from a collective or derivative work is es-
sential because this distinction determines the rights an author will acquire.
Authors of derivative and collective works own only their respective contri-
butions.98 In contrast, authors of a joint work own an equal and undivided
interest in the entire work. 99 For example, if a song is a collective work and
a composer licenses the musical portion of that song, the lyricist cannot ob-
tain a share of the composer's income from the license agreement. 10 How-
88. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069.
89. Id.
90. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, supra Part II.B.
91. A derivative work is a "work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a trans-
lation, [or] musical arrangement." Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
92. A collective work is a "work, such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in
which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in themselves, are
assembled into a collective whole." Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
93. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.05, at 6-13.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
95. 1 NIMMER& NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.05, at 6-13.
96. ld.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
98. See id. § 103(b).
99. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 505 (2d Cir. 1991); 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
100. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (stating that "[t]he copyright in a compilation or de-
rivative work extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work....").
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ever, if the song is a joint work, then the composer must share the proceeds
from that license with the lyricist who is co-owner of the copyright in that
song.
1
III. CASELAW SHINES A SPOTLIGHT ON COLLABORATORS IN THEATER
A. Two Approaches to Evaluating the Contributions of Joint Authors
The 1976 Act mandates that only fixed1°0 works of original authorship
are copyrightable. 03 To identify joint works that meet this statutory re-
quirement, courts are split in evaluating the contributions of authors claim-
ing joint authorship status.' 4 The majority approach requires that the indi-
vidual contribution of each joint author be copyrightable. 05 Professor Paul
Goldstein, a well-respected copyright scholar, °6 supports the majority
view.'0 7  On the other hand, the minority approach only requires that the
combined result of the joint efforts be copyrightable.'0 8 This proposition is
supported by Professor Melville Nimmer,1°9 another well-respected copy-
right scholar.l°
1. The Nimmer Approach
Nimmer interprets the 1976 Act to require only that each contribution
"be more than de minimis" or that "more than a word or a line ... be added
101. See generally id. § 20 1(a) (1994) (stating that "[t]he authors of a joint work are co-
owners of copyright in the work").
102. A work is "'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or
phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it
to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than a transitory du-
ration." Id. § 101.
103. Id. § 102(a).
104. Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1069 (7th Cir. 1994); Childress v. Tay-
lor, 945 F.2d 500, 506 (2d Cir. 1991).
105. See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069; Childress, 945 F.2d at 506.
106. Paul Goldstein is an author of a well-respected copyright treatise. See Russ VerSteeg,
Defining "Author 'for Purposes of Copyright, 45 AM. U. L. REv. 1323, 1326 (1996).
107. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW & PRACTICE, § 4.2.1.2 (1994); see
Childress, 945 F.2d at 506.
108. See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069; Childress, 945 F.2d at 506.
109. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.07, at 6-23; see also Childress, 945 F.2d at
506.
110. Nimmer, the late copyright scholar, also wrote a well-respected copyright treatise and
was a professor of law at the University of California at Los Angeles. VerSteeg, supra note 106, at
1333.
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by one who claims to be a joint author." '1 Under this approach, if authors
A and B collaborate to write a book, where A contributes plot ideas and B
incorporates those ideas into a completed literary expression, A and B would
be joint authors of the work.11 2
Nimmer's proposition is problematic in two respects. First, it violates
the spirit of the Constitution's copyright clause which encourages the crea-
tion of works for the benefit of the public." 3 Because this view does not
mandate that each individual contribution be an original work of authorship
or otherwise copyrightable, an individual author need only provide more
than a de minimis contribution to be considered a joint author." 4  Conse-
quently, an author can contribute something that is not copyrightable, such
as an idea or concept,"1 5 and still be considered a joint author of a copyrigh-
table work. For instance, suppose author A suggests creating a comedic
sidekick who imparts dating advice to her best friend, the lead female char-
acter. If author B successfully incorporates that idea into a completed ro-
mantic comedy, author A is considered a joint author of the story. An author
who contributes copyrightable material would be loath to share authorship
status with one who does not contribute copyrightable material. Therefore,
this approach chills the creative process because authors will hesitate to ask
for assistance in developing their projects. 16 The result will be a decrease in
the production of creative works. This ultimately disadvantages the public,
and thwarts the fundamental purpose behind the Copyright Clause.
111. 1 NMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.07, at 6-23.
112. 1d.
113. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S.
1198 and S. 1253 Before the Subcomm on Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks of the Senate
Coman. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 210-11 (1989) (statement of Ralph Oman) [hereinafter
Hearings]; see also supra Part ll.B. (stating the purpose of copyright law).
114. In fact, Nimmer acknowledged that the "standard of de minimis is not necessarily the
same as the standard for copyrightability." 1 NIMIv ER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.07, at 6-23.
115. The Act does not extend copyright protection to ideas, concepts, or discoveries. Copy-
right Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). The Act and the legislative history distinguish be-
tween ideas, which are not copyrightable, and the expression of ideas, which are copyrightable.
See id. § 102(b); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56-57 (1976). For example, the theory that the Hin-
denburgh was deliberately sabotaged by a member of its crew to embarrass the Nazi regime is not
copyrightable. See A.A. Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980). In
contrast, the way this theory is told, organized, and expressed in a historical book is copyrightable.
See generally, Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879) (holding that only the portion of the
plaintiff's book explaining the accounting system could secure copyright protection, but the plain-
tiff could not prevent others from using a chart similar to his in implementing this system); Morris-
sey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir. 1967) (providing that "copyright at-
taches to [the] form of expression").
116. Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1070 (7th Cir. 1994); see also supra
Part II.D.3 and infra Parts III.B. 1 .b and IV.A.2 (explaining that the mere collaboration standard
can chill the creative process).
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The second shortcoming of Nimmer's approach is the ambiguity of his
more than de minimis standard.11 7 Nimmer provides little guidance as to
when a contribution rises to the level of joint authorship, except that the
contribution must be more than a word or line.118 This ambiguity could re-
sult in inconsistent case law, as courts will have dissimilar interpretations of
what constitutes "more than a word or line." Artists will resist collaboration
because of difficulties in predicting how joint authorship claims will be re-
solved. Ultimately, the combined goal of the Copyright Clause and the
Copyright Act will be frustrated.
2. The Goldstein Approach
The majority of courts and the Register of Copyright119 support Gold-
stein's view that requires each contribution to be independently copyrigh-
table. 20 Given the uncertainty of the Nimmer approach, Goldstein's view is
more persuasive. Specifically, by requiring copyrightable contributions
from all putative authors, the Goldstein approach prevents frivolous claims
by those seeking to share the profits of a work created by a sole author.
121
In addition, this prevailing view finds an appropriate balance between copy-
right and contract law. 122 In the absence of a contract providing otherwise,
copyright vests in only those authors who created the copyrightable contri-
butions. 1 23 A person with non-copyrightable material who collaborates with
a copyright owner can agree to contribute their material for an assignment of
part ownership in the copyright. 124 Indeed, copyright law best serves the in
117. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 36, § 6.07, at 6-23.
118. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070.
119. Congress authorized the Register of Copyright to issue regulations on copyright law.
See GORMAN& GORMAN, supra note 35, at 382.
120. See Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1065; Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 507 (2d Cir. 1991);
M.G.B. Homes, Inc. v. Ameron Homes, Inc., 903 F.2d 1486, 1493 (11 th Cir. 1990); S.O.S., Inc. v.
Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1087 (9th Cir. 1989); Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F.
Supp. 743, 764 (P.R. 1995); Ashton-Tate Corp. v. Ross, 728 F. Supp. 597, 601 (N.D. Cal. 1989);
Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Material Things, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1039, 1044-45 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.N.J. 1981); see also Hearings, supra note 113,
at 210-11. However, textual support for Goldstein's approach is lacking because the Copyright
Act does not mention that each contribution to a joint work must be copyrightable. Childress v.
Taylor, 945 F.2d at 506. Further, the Act's requirement of an "author" does not necessarily re-
quire copyrightable contributions; it only requires that the work originate from the author as op-
posed to being copied from another source. Id. at 507.
121. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
122. ld.
123. Id.
124. Id.
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terest of creativity when it "carefully draws the bounds of 'joint authorship'
so as to protect the legitimate claims of both sole authors and co-authors. 1 5
B. The Childress Test
1. Examining the Childress Test
a. The Facts of Childress
Courts have ruled that not every individual who contributes to the
creative process should be accorded joint authorship status. In Childress v.
Taylor,126 actress Clarice Taylor developed an idea for a play and hired
playwright Alice Childress to write it.127 Taylor's contribution consisted of
assembling research materials, interviewing people upon whom the play's
characters were based, incorporating jokes from the research material into
the play, and recommending that certain scenes and characters be in-
cluded.128 The Second Circuit in Childress developed a two-pronged test to
determine whether Taylor was a joint author of the resulting play. 
129
The test, subsequently adopted in other jurisdictions, 30 requires that
each putative joint author: (1) make an independently copyrightable contri-
bution, and (2) regard each other as joint authors at the time the work was
created.13' Because Taylor merely offered helpful advice and did not con-
tribute independently copyrightable material, the court found that she failed
to meet the "independence" prong of the court's test.
1 32
With respect to the second component, the "mutual intent" prong, the
court stated that Childress and Taylor's subsequent conduct did not support
the contention that they regarded each other as joint authors at the time the
play was created. 33 In particular, the Childress court focused on the fact
that Childress rejected a joint ownership deal, which Taylor's agent negoti-
125. Id. at 504.
126. 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991).
127. Id. at 501-02.
128. Id. at 502.
129. Id. at 506-07.
130. See, e.g., Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 196 (2d Cir. 1998); Erickson v. Trinity
Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994); Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F.
Supp. 743, 764 (P.R. 1995); Clogston v. American Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 930 F. Supp.
1156, 1158 (W.D. Tex. 1996).
131. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 200; Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1061, 1067-68, 1070-71; Childress,
945 F.2d at 507-08.
132. Childress, 945 F.2d at 509.
133. Id.
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ated while the play was being written.'3 Taylor did not object to Childress'
rejection of the joint ownership deal, further indicating to the court that the
artists did not regard each other as joint authors.
135
b. Application of the Childress Test
The independence prong of the Childress test incorporates the Gold-
stein approach by mandating that each author contribute a copyrightable
original work of authorship to the final project. 136 However, the mutual in-
tent prong is controversial because the legislative history of the 1976 Act re-
quires only intent and knowledge for the contribution to be merged into a
unitary whole. 137 In comparison, the Childress court heightened the scrutiny
by examining whether "each participant intended that all would be identified
as co-authors .. .[or] .. .how the parties implicitly regarded their under-
taking."'138 Although not explicitly supported by the 1976 Act's legislative
history, the mutual intent prong created by the Childress court furthers
Congress' intent.139 To merely require an intent and knowledge that one's
contribution be merged into a whole extends joint authorship status to many
people who were not likely to be considered joint authors by Congress.
140
To illustrate, a writer frequently works with an editor who makes numerous
revisions to the writer's first draft; those revisions constitute copyrightable
expressions. 41 Although the writer and editor both intend for their contri-
butions to be merged into inseparable parts of a whole, neither would
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 506; see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 107, § 4.2.1.2.; see also supra Part III.A.2.
137. Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).
138. Childress, 945 F.2d at 508.
139. Id. at 507. Several jurisdictions support the Childress court's interpretation of the
statutory language. See, e.g., Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1070; Papa's-June Music, Inc. v. McLean, 921
F. Supp. 1154, 1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Design Option v. Bellepoint, Inc., 940 F. Supp. 86, 90
(S.D.N.Y. 1996); Fred Riley Home Bldg. Corp. v. Cosgrove, 883 F. Supp. 1478, 1482 (Kan.
1995); Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743, 767 (P.R. 1995); Muller v. Walt
Disney Prods., 871 F. Supp. 678, 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Aymes v. Bonelli, No. 85 Civ. 2228
(JSM), 1994 WL 97026 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1994). Some scholars argue that the Supreme
Court decision in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989), merely
requires an artist's intent to merge their individual part into a unitary whole. See Thomson v. Lar-
son, 147 F.3d 195, 201 n.17 (2d Cir. 1998). However, the Supreme Court remanded the case on
the issue ofjoint authorship and did not discuss it further. Conununity for Creative Non Violence,
490 U.S. 730-753. Thus, Childress is not at odds with Community for Creative Non-Violence.
140. Childress, 945 F.2d at 507.
141. Id.
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identify the editor as joint author, nor would they expect the editor to receive
an equal, undivided interest in the article.
42
Consequently, in order to obtain joint authorship status, artists must
regard each other as joint authors, whether or not they fully understand the
legal consequences of that relationship.143 In the absence of a contractual
agreement concerning authorship, the Childress test requires courts to look
at factors such as billing or credit to determine whether the artists regarded
each other as joint authors. 44 Credit can be given on playbills, record jack-
ets, other publicity material,1 4' and past drafts of the pertinent work.46
A court should also consider the collaborator's conduct after the work
is finished, which can be probative of the collaborator's state of mind at the
time the work was created.147 Furthermore, evidence of an author working
alone with the permission of other putative authors indicates that the artists
did not regard each other as co-authors. 4  The quality and quantity of a
collaborator's contribution is another factor in determining sole author-
ship.' 49 Finally, other factors include the written agreements between the
collaborators, whether a collaborator retains the authority to approve
changes in the work, and whether a collaborator enters into agreements re-
garding the work without being required to obtain the consent of the oth-
ers. 1
50
2. The Progeny of Childress
In Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 151 the Seventh Circuit found that
company actors who assisted in developing a playwright's three plays were
not joint authors. 52 For the first play, the playwright created the stories on
which the play was based.1 53  Each actor then improvised their assigned
142. Id.
143. Id. at 508.
144. Id.
145. Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743, 756 (P.R. 1995).
146. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1998).
147. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 509. For example, the court found that Taylor's acquies-
cence over the playwright's rejection of the joint ownership deal was probative of Taylor's prior
state of mind. Id.
148. See Cabrera, 914 F. Supp. at 756. Upon witnessing that the author worked alone on
the script, the other artists who claimed joint authorship did not intervene and allowed the play-
wright to continue working without them. Id.
149. See Thomson, 147 F.3d at 202.
150. Id. at 202-203, 204.
151. 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994).
152. Id. at 1062.
153. Id. at 1072.
UPSTAGING THE PLAYWRIGHT
story to supply ideas for the dialogue. 4 For the second play, an actor sug-
gested including a passage from William Shakespeare's Macbeth.'55 For the
third play, the actors developed a scene by improvisation during rehearsal.1
5 6
The playwright then compiled her rehearsal notes to complete the script.
1 57
The Seventh Circuit ruled that the company actors failed to contribute
independently copyrightable works to any of the three plays, because ideas
and refinements standing alone are not copyrightable. 58 Arguably, however,
the actors satisfied the independence prong of the Childress test by contrib-
uting original material developed from their own thought processes. 5 9
Moreover, those contributions were "fixed" under the actors' consent by the
playwright who incorporated their comments into the final script.160
The Erickson court persuasively concluded that because the playwright
and the company did not regard each other as co-authors when the plays
were created, the company failed to meet the mutual intent prong of the
Childress test.16' The court found that the playwright retained final control
over the creative process, because she decided what to incorporate into the
finished scripts. 162  Additionally, the actors yielded to her final decision-
making authority. 163 Hence, the court did not find joint authorship in any of
the three situations. 164
Similarly, in Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc.,165 the court did not
find the members of a non-profit theater company to be joint authors of a
playwright's project.' The company consisted of actors, directors, writers,
and executive producers. 67 They discussed line by line what the playwright
wrote and then rewrote portions of the play. 168  Afterward, the playwright
incorporated the collaborative revisions into the play's final draft. 1
69
154. See id. at 1064.
155. Id. at 1063.
156. Id. at 1064. See note 26 and accompanying text (explaining the improvisation process);
see also BROCKETT, supra note 27, at 147-48.
157. Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1064 (7th Cir. 1994).
158. Id. at 1072.
159. See id. at 1063-65.
160. See id.; see Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994) (stating when a work is
"fixed").
161. Erickson, 13 F.3d. at 1072.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1073.
165. 914 F. Supp. 743 (P.R. 1995).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 745.
168. Id. at 753.
169. Id. at 754.
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In reaching its conclusion, the court narrowly interpreted what consti-
tutes a copyrightable work. 170 Despite the fact that the company's work was
fixed into the play's final draft, the court still found that the contributions
were mere ideas. 171 Because the members of the company could not specifi-
cally identify their contributions in the play's final version, the court did not
find their contributions to be copyrightable. 72 However, the Cabrera
court's interpretation of the 1976 Act's requirement of a fixed original work
of authorship seems narrower than what Congress intended. According to
prior case law interpreting the 1976 Act, a potential joint author only has to
prove that their contribution possessed a modicum of creativity and was not
copied from someone else.' 73 Requiring an artist to distinguish their work
from another's in a well-integrated play questionably heightens the factual
scrutiny as to whether something is copyrightable, and thereby satisfies the
independence prong of the Childress test.
The Cabrera court found that the company also failed to prove that all
the collaborators regarded each other as co-authors. 74 For example, the
theater provided the playwright with a place where she could work alone.
7 1
In addition, the playwright rewrote portions of the script without objection
from the company. 76 Furthermore, the members of the company were paid
as actors and directors, not as co-authors. 77 Finally, the court considered
the playbill, which referred to the members merely as "script consultants.'
178
Ultimately, the court did not find joint authorship. "
Focusing on Childress and its progeny is instructive because they re-
veal that recent joint authorship suits arise in the context of new play devel-
opment, which is a highly collaborative process. Further, compared to the
1976 Act, the Erickson and Cabrera courts used a stricter approach to-
wards identifying a copyrightable contribution, making it more difficult for
collaborators to claim joint authorship. Collectively, these cases indicate
that the mutual intent prong is necessarily analyzed on a fact intensive, case-
by-case basis.
170. Id. at 765.
171. Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp 743, 766 (P.R. 1995); see Copyright
Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 56-57 (1976) (explaining that
ideas are not copyrightable); see also supra note 102 and accompanying text.
172. Cabrera, 914 F. Supp. at 756.
173. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining the definition of "author").
174. Cabrera, 914 F. Supp. at 756.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 766-68.
UPSTAGING THE PLAYWRIGHT
3. A Correct Application of Childress: Thomson v. Larson
a. The Independence Prong
The Second Circuit appropriately ruled in favor of the late playwright,
Jonathan Larson, by denying joint authorship of Rent to the dramaturg,
Lynn Thomson.180 Applying the independence prong of the Childress test,
the court concluded that Thomson contributed copyrightable material.18
Thomson and Larson revised the script together at Larson's apartment.
82
Thomson developed the plot and theme, contributed to the story, developed
some characters, and re-wrote a significant portion of the dialogue and lyr-
ics.' 83 In the meantime, Larson occasionally inserted verbatim some of
Thomson's notes into his computer. 84 Experts evaluated Thomson and Lar-
son's collaborated version as a "radical transformation of the show.'
' 85 Al-
though Larson typed in the changes, the material was fixed into Larson's
computer with Thomson's consent. 8 6 Thomson clearly contributed original
work. As a result, the court concluded that the demands of the independence
prong were met.
b. The Mutual Intent Prong
i. Billing and Credit
Although the court found that the independence prong was met, upon
properly applying the mutual intent prong, the court found that Larson and
Thomson did not have the requisite intent that Rent be a joint work at the
time of its creation. 8 7 The court found that although billing or credit is not
decisive, it is a "window [into] the mind of the party who is responsible for
giving the billing or the credit" and "a writer's attribution of the work to
herself alone is 'persuasive proof ... that she intended [the work] to repre-
180. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 195 (2d Cir. 1998).
181. Id. at 200-01.
182. Id. at 197.
183. Id. at 198 n.10.
184. Id. at 197, 201 n.14, citing Thomson v. Larson, 96 Civ. 8876 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding
that Thomson contributed between zero and nine percent of the material) (on file with the Loyola
of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
185. Id. at 198.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 204. Because Thomson testified as to her intent, much of the court's analysis fo-
cused on whether Larson intended to regard Thomson as a joint author, because he died in Janu-
ary, 1996, nine months before the suit was filed. Id. at 198.
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sent her own individual authorship."" 88 In the Thomson case, all drafts of
the script's title page bore the credit, "'Rent', by Jonathan Larson" to which
Thomson did not object. 89 Thomson also did not object to Larson's listing
himself as "author/composer" in the off-Broadway production's playbill.' 90
In the same playbill, Thomson was listed as "dramaturg."' 9' Additionally,
Thomson acknowledged Larson as the "composer and librettist of 'Rent"' in
a profile of Larson that she wrote for another theater publication. 92 Thom-
son also conceded that she never sought equal billing with Larson.193
ii. Written Agreements
In addition to maintaining exclusive credit for the authorship of the
play, Larson also designated himself as the sole author of the new revision in
all contracts with NYTW.194 The fact that Larson entered into a contract
without Thomson's consent indicates that he did not regard her as a joint
author.' 9' Moreover, Larson agreed to an option deal specifying that royalty
payments were to flow to him as the "author."' 96 This agreement did not
mention Thomson.
97
Prior to the collaboration, Thomson signed a contract with NYTW de-
fining her role as dramaturg 98 and setting her fee at $2,000.199 Thomson
also signed a dramaturgical contract with Rent's Broadway producers after
she and Larson created the show's final draft.200  The agreement provided
that Thomson be billed as "dramaturg" on the staff credit page. 20 1 At no
point during the negotiations with either NYTW or the Broadway producers
188. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Weissman v. Freeman,
868 F.2d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir. 1989)).
189. 1d.
190. Id. at 204.
191. Id. at 203.
192. Blumenthal, supra note 10, at B2.
193. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 203. Thomson argued that she did not need equal billing to be
deemed a statutory co-author, but this did not preclude the court from finding that there was no
mutual intent. Id.
194. Id. at 204.
195. Id.
196. Id. at n.26.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 197. Thomson's responsibilities were to "include, but not be limited to:
[p]roviding dramaturgical assistance and research to the playwright and director." Id.
199. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
200. Id.
201. See id.
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did Thomson claim to be Rent's co-author. °2 As a result, Thomson failed to
meet the requirements of the mutual intent prong.
iii. Additional Manifestations of Intent
The court also considered additional facts in coming to the conclusion
that Larson and Thomson did not consider each other as joint authors of
Rent. For instance, the agreement between Larson and NYTW gave Larson
the discretion to make final changes to the Rent script. 203 Furthermore, be-
fore Thomson was hired, NYTW's artistic director recommended that Lar-
son refine the script with a bookwriter's assistance. 204 Larson steadfastly
rejected this recommendation because he wanted to make Rent "entirely his
own project. 205 These facts persuaded the court to determine that Larson
206
never intended to have a joint authorship relationship with anyone.
IV. COPYRIGHT LAW AFFORDS DRAMATURGS INADEQUATE PROTECTION
A. Why Dramaturgs Cannot Pass the Childress Test
1. The Independence Prong
Dramaturgs will generally not be accorded joint authorship because
they cannot satisfy the two-pronged test established by the Childress court.
In particular, most dramaturgs cannot fulfill the requirement that their con-
tributions be independently copyrightable. Many dramaturgs assist play-
wrights by asking the right questions, not by proposing or writing solutions
themselves. 2 7 For example, instead of rewriting or suggesting certain lines
to strengthen a character, a dramaturg will encourage the playwright to de-
velop a more specific or sympathetic character.2 8 The dramaturg is the
author of this suggestion because it originates from them. However, this
type of contribution does not meet the statutory requirement that it be fixed
202. See id.
203. Id. at 203.
204. Id. at 204.
205. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 204 (2d Cir. 1998).
206. Id.
207. See Evans, supra note 6, at 61, 63; William Grimes, On Stage, and Off, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 29, 1996, at C2; Pressley, supra note 16, at D2.
208. Telephone Interview with Mandy Mishelle, supra note 14. See generally Evans, supra
note 6, at 61 (quoting one of the lead actors in Rent who stated that dramaturgs "ask the questions
that make the writer deepen the work").
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in a tangible medium of expression.209 Accordingly, the independence prong
is not satisfied.
However, some dramaturgs actually make written contributions.10 In
Rent, for instance, Thomson rewrote some of the dialogue and lyrics.2" Un-
like the previous example, such a contribution meets the requirements of the
independence prong.21 2 The dramaturg is the author of the revised lyrics be-
cause they created it. Moreover, a dramaturg who dictates their proposals to
a playwright, who then types them into a computer, will still be considered
to have fixed the work into a tangible medium because a work may be fixed
by or under the authority of the author.21 3 Consequently, a dramaturg under
these circumstances satisfies the demands of the independence prong.
2. The Defects of the Mutual Intent Prong
By examining whether contributors to a work regarded each other as
joint authors, the second prong of the Childress test utilizes a stricter inquiry
than the 1976 Act intended.214 However, this stringent analysis furthers
Congress' intent by excluding those works that Congress did not intend to
protect. 1 5 Although Congressional intent is satisfied, this does not suggest
that the mutual intent prong is without flaws. Rather, proving a contribu-
tor's state of mind begets a subjective and inexact analysis.216 In fact,
"Childress and its progeny.., do not explicitly define the nature of neces-
sary intent" that joint authors must possess to win their claims.21 7 Unfortu-
nately, the Childress analysis essentially turns on the contributor's own
words or professed state of mind.
In defense of the Childress test, the Second Circuit in Thomson held
that the mutual intent standard is not strictly subjective. 21 8 The Second Cir-
209. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); see also supra note 102 and
accompanying text (defining "fixed").
210. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 197 n.5 (2d Cir. 1998).
211. Id. at 197 n.10.
212. But see Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743 (P.R. 1995). The Ca-
brera court took a narrow approach as to what constituted an expression as opposed to an idea.
See supra Part III.B.2.
213. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
214. See supra Part III.B.1 .b.
215. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
216. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 201; see also Thomson v. Larson, No. 96 Civ. 8876, 615, 738
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating that the court acknowledged the plaintiff attorney's frustration resulting
from the circularity of the mutual intent prong) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment
Law Journal).
217. Thomson, 147 F.3dat201.
218. Id.
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cuit found that the test requires a "more nuanced inquiry into factual indicia
of ownership and authorship, such as how a collaborator regarded herself in
relation to the work in terms of billing and credit, decisionmaking, the right
to enter into contracts., 21 9 Granted, the Childress court recognized that the
numerous contexts giving rise to joint authorship issues prevented it from
crafting a specific rule with respect to the second prong. 220 However, in do-
ing so, the Childress test sacrifices consistency and predictability because
many of the factors used to analyze whether the contributors regarded each
other as joint authors can only be resolved on a case-by-case basis.
Additionally, the mutual intent prong is circular. In order to win her
case, a putative joint author needs to prove that the other author regarded
her as a co-author.221 This requirement seems tautological because the ex-
istence of a document or conduct indicating both authors' acknowledgment
of co-authorship prevents the need for a lawsuit in the first place.222 In fact,
the judge in Thomson proffered that he "share[d] a little bit of [the plaintiff
attorney's] frustration, because there [was] some degree ...[of] circular-
ity."1223
Moreover, given the playwright's status in theater compared to that of
a dramaturg, the mutual intent prong is constructed in such a way that a
dramaturg will almost always lose their case. Theatrical writers are distin-
guished from those in other performance media, such as film or television.224
In particular, a playwright retains ownership of their play and receives in-
come from and exercises control over all of the play's subsequent produc-
tions. 225 Thus, absent a contract granting joint authorship, a playwright in-
evitably will not regard their dramaturg as a joint author.226 Therefore,
219. Id.
220. See Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500, 508 (2d Cir. 1991) (explaining that the applica-
tion of the Childress test was meant to vary according to the facts of each case).
221. See id.
222. Alisa Solomon, Rent Destabilized, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Aug. 12, 1997, at 83.
223. Thomson v. Larson, No. 96 Civ. 8876, 615, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (on file with Loyola
of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
224. Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 203 n.22 (2d Cir. 1998).
225. Keller, supra note 41, at 891. However, because of industry practice, writers in televi-
sion and film do not retain copyright ownership of their works. ld at 892. Trade practices in the
film and television industries require script writers to designate their screenplays as works made-
for-hire. Id. at 892 n.6 Thus, the producing entity holds the copyright in the work. Id
226. Most dramaturgs work on scripts as employees of the producing theater, and even ab-
sent an agreement waiving ownership of copyrights, employees do not have any copyright interest
under the work made-for-hire doctrine. Thomson, 147 F.3d at 205 (referring to the Brief for Amici
Curiae, The National Writers Union and Literary Managers and Dramaturgs of the Americans,
Inc., at 4-5). Even if the playwright is not the copyright owner of the material, given the collabo-
rative nature of theater, "any 'contribution' of copyrightable material should be understood as con-
veying with it to the playwright a non-exclusive license to use the collaborator's material in the
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although a dramaturg provides copyrightable work, it will not be considered
a joint authorship because it will not satisfy the mutual intent prong of the
Childress test.
Yet, there are cases in which collaborators were found to be statutory
joint authors even though they did not intend to be. 27 These cases rely on an
objective indicia of intent, such as determining whether a potential joint
work contains inseparable or interdependent parts.228 This objective test fo-
cuses only on the existence of collaboration, and would grant joint author-
ship status to those who Congress did not intend to receive such a status. 29
Given the especially collaborative nature of theater, this less exacting stan-
dard will deem any artist developing a new play, such as an actor or chore-
ographer, a joint author.230  As such, any playwright would hesitate before
asking for feedback on developing their piece.2 31  Therefore, although the
Childress test is flawed, it provides for more equitable results than a com-
pletely objective test.
B. Policy Issues
The Childress test advances the 1976 Copyright Act's policy goals.
The ultimate purpose of copyright legislation is to encourage learning. 232 Its
233secondary purpose is to reward authors for their contributions to society.These two purposes are closely related. An economic reward provides an
work, absent some other arrangement in writing." Id. (quoting Brief for Amicus Curiae, The
Dramatists Guild, Inc., at 30).
227. See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 753 (1989)
(suggesting in dicta that two self-alleged sole authors might be held to be joint authors if they
"prepared the work 'with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or inter-
dependent parts of a unitary whole') (quoting 17 U.S.C § 101); Easter Seal Soc. for Crippled
Children & Adults, Inc. v. Playboy Enter., 815 F.2d 323, 337 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Although the par-
ties have refused to acknowledge it ... it seems clear to us that [the contributions] were interde-
pendent joint works of authorship ...."); Strauss v. Hearts Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832, 1837 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding co-authorship despite one party's denial of having co-authorship intent).
228. In Communityfor Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, one party created the pedestal for a
life-sized figure designed by another party. 490 U.S. at 730. Another case involved a magazine
article written by two people. Strauss, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1837 n.5. See also supra notes 76-77 and
accompanying text (defining "inseparable" and "interdependent").
229. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
230. See supra Parts II.D.3, III.A.1, and III.B.I.b.
231. See supra Parts II.D.3, III.A.I, and III.B.l.b.
232. See GoRMAN& GINSBURG, supra note 35, at 15.
233. Id. at 16.
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incentive for authors to create and disseminate their projects.234 The public
thereby benefits by having access to these works.
235
Even though dramaturgs are not individually rewarded for their contri-
butions through copyright ownership, an appropriate balance exists between
the interests of the playwright and public. The playwright creates a play
with the dramaturg's assistance, and the public consequently has access to
the work.236 If dramaturgs were joint authors of a play, they would still hold
an equal, undivided interest in the play even though their contribution to the
play was not as significant as the playwright's. 2 7  Hence, recognizing the
dramaturg as joint author will cause a playwright to avoid asking for assis-
tance because the playwright will fear losing sole authorship of the work.238
Discouraged from seeking assistance, the playwright will create an inferior
work or abandon the project altogether. In turn, the public will not have an
opportunity to enjoy the play, and the copyright legislation's primary goal
will be hindered.239
Furthermore, the Childress test is in accord with the Supreme Court's
rejection of the "sweat of the brow" doctrine.2"° The policy rationale behind
this doctrine focuses on rewarding an author with copyright ownership for
their diligent efforts in creating the work. 24' Therefore, although the
dramaturg invests substantial energy by assisting the playwright, diligence
alone does not justify giving joint ownership of the play to the dramaturg.
Although it promotes the 1976 Act's policy goals, the Childress test
does not necessarily further the Act's other goals of administrative and judi-
cial efficiency.242 A test must be clear enough to allow the artists to predict
whether their contributions to a work will receive copyright protection. 243
With a well-constructed test, putative joint authors can avoid post-
contribution disputes regarding authorship. 2' With such a test, they also
know when to protect themselves by contract before the collaboration, if it
234. See id.; see also Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975); Sony
Corp of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
235. GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at 15.
236. Telephone Interview with Mandy Mishelle, supra note 14.
237. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc.,
13 F.3d 1061, 1068 (7th Cir. 1994).
238. See supra Parts II.D.3. and III.A. 1.
239. See supra Parts II.D.3. and III.A.1.
240. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 353 (1991) (holding that
copyright ownership should not be given to the individual devising the white pages of a telephone
book consisting of 46,878 listings merely because of the hard work he invested in the project).
241. Id.
242. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1069.
243. id.
244. Id.
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appears that they will not be protected under the Act. 45 Flaws in the appli-
cation of Childress' mutual intent prong, however, fail to provide for these
predictable and objective outcomes.
246
C. Copyright Law is Impracticably Applied to Theater
Applying copyright law to theatrical collaboration may lead to unfair
results. In Thomson, the deciding judge conceded that the "letter of the law
does not align completely with what may be just .. ,247 Similarly, the Ca-
brera court noted that although the strict application of statutory require-
ments "may have produced what might be considered an unfair result,. . . [it
was] bound to follow.., the law. '248 In identifying joint authors, copyright
law typically requires documented and measurable results, whereas, theatri-
cal collaboration demands an energized and spontaneous exchange between
the collaborators. 24 9 Thus, copyright law may not be equipped to identify a
joint author in the context of new play development because of copyright
250law's rigid requirements.
For instance, copyright law's notion of "fixed" may not be part of an
artist's vocabulary. In addition, fixation of a performance may be a for-
eign concept to performance artists.252  These artists do not work from a
written script and often improvise their work during their actual perform-
ance.213  Performance art also emphasizes audience participation so each
show is unique depending on the audience's reaction.2 4 Therefore, perform-
ance artists cannot fix their movements or spontaneous ideas in any script or
245. Id.
246. See supra Part IV.A.2. (analyzing the flaws of the mutual intent prong).
247. Stuart, supra note 17, at C16; see also Thomson v. Larson, 96 Civ. 8876, 615, 729
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("[T]his case is not [about] whether Lynn Thomson made a great contribution to
the show... [ilt is about whether... Lynn Thompson and Jon Larson met the statutory definition
... of a joint work.") (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
248. Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743, 768 (P.R. 1995).
249. Solomon, supra note 222, at 83. Plays are created either from the improvisational act-
ing efforts of a group or the combined individual contributions of the writer, director, dramaturg,
costume and lighting designer. See BROCKETT, supra note 27, at 147-50; see also Keller, supra
note 41, at 908.
250. Some commentators argue that the Copyright Act "discriminates against modem artists
because it draws lines using traditional notions of creation , . .." Lori Petruzzelli, Copyright
Problems in Post-Modern Art, 5 J. ART. & ENT. LAw 115, 115 (1994).
251. As noted earlier, for an original work of authorship to be copyrightable, it must be fixed
in a tangible medium. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994); see also supra note 102
and accompanying text (defining "fixed").
252. See BROCKETT, supra note 27, at 632, 636.
253. Id. at 632.
254. ld.
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other tangible medium.255 Because they cannot fix their work, it is not copy-
rightable and will not meet the demands of the independence prong. Un-
doubtedly, however, these performance artists are indeed authors of their
live shows.
Pinpointing time also creates a rift between theater and copyright law.
The legislative history behind the 1976 Act emphasizes that the "touchstone
is the intention, at the time the writing is done ... ,,56 Determining
when a writing is completed is difficult in the context of theater, especially
257with new play development situations. NYTW is typical of theaters that
have workshops to develop material in an ensemble environment that nur-
tures free-flowing discussion amongst the participants. 8  Under such cir-
cumstances, documenting the exact moment a writing is finished would be
difficult, if not impossible, because of the play's organic evolution.259
Therefore, the mutual intent prong of the Childress test places unfair obsta-
cles in a collaborator's path to joint ownership of a work.26 ° Consequently,
copyright law is not well-suited to the collaborative nature of theater.
D. The Advantages ofApplying Contract Law
Due to the inadequacies of copyright law, the Second Circuit recom-
mended that artists protect their collaborative efforts through contracts gov-
erning the division of royalties or assignment of copyright ownership. 61 In
fact, the 1976 Act itself states that any of the exclusive ownership rights in a
copyright may be transferred262 from the person who obtains the copyright to
one who purchases the ability to exercise those rights.263 Even if a collabo-
rator does not make a copyrightable contribution to a completed work, that
collaborator still has the opportunity to share in the profits through a con-
255. Id.
256. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 120 (1976).
257. See Solomon, supra note 222, at 83.
258. Telephone Interview with Mandy Mishelle, supra note 14.
259. All the joint authorship suits involving plays occurred in the context of new play devel-
opment in smaller theaters. See generally Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d Cir. 1998)
(involving a non-profit theater that workshopped new plays); Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13
F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving actors who developed the playwright's works in a small en-
semble theater company); Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2nd Cir. 1991) (involving an actress
who developed a play with a playwright); Cabrera v. Teatro Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743
(P.R. 1995) (involving a non-profit theater company that made changes to a working script by
committee).
260. See supra Parts IV.A.2 and III.B.1 .b.
261. See Childress, 945 F.2d at 508; see also Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 201(d)(1)
(1994).
262. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d); see alsoErickson, 13 F.3d at 1071.
263. Erickson, 13 F.3d at 1071.
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tractual agreement. 26  Such an agreement can assign part of the copyright
ownership from the copyright owner to the collaborator or specify that a
portion of the royalties flows to the others. 26' A contributor can also con-
tract for rights beyond remuneration, such as acknowledgment for their con-
tribution.266
Contract law provides adequate protection for the artist where copy-
right law fails. With a written contract, a dramaturg can memorialize a
clear agreement of joint authorship with the playwright.267  Organizations
261such as the Literary Managers and Dramaturgs of America, can assist
dramaturgs during contract negotiations by giving them bargaining lever-
age.269 Once the putative joint authors make their promises, a valid contract
enforceable by a court of law exists . 7  If a contributor does not fulfill a
promise, the injured contributor may bring a lawsuit for breach of con-
tract. 27  Determining the merits of such a lawsuit is more feasible than that
of a copyright suit, because the basis of a contract suit is the written docu-
ment that supplies the artists' express rights and obligations.272
In contrast, various factors complicate the determination of the merits
in a copyright suit. For instance, courts interpret the independence prong of
the Childress test differently. 273 Some courts have conducted a stricter
analysis than the 1976 Act would require, such as requiring an artist to
identify their contribution in a completed work to determine whether the
contribution is independently copyrightable. 274 The challenge in identifying
a copyrightable work is compounded by the difficulty in distinguishing an
idea from an expression because only expressions are copyrightable.275 The
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Beth Freemal, Theatre, Stage Directions & Copyright Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1017, 1039 (1996).
267. Id. at 1037.
268. This is an organization devoted to dramaturgs' interests. See telephone Interview with
Mandy Mishelle, supra note 14.
269. Id.
270. Freemal, supra note 266, at 1037; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
17.
271. Freemal, supra note 266, at 1037; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §
1.
272. Freemal, supra note 266, at 1037.
273. See supra Part III.B.2.
274. See supra Part III.B.2.
275. See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (explaining that the Act does not
protect ideas); see also Mason v. Montgomery, 967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that "in
some cases, however, it is so difficult to distinguish between an idea and its expression that the two
are said to merge.").
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shortcomings of the Childress test's mutual intent prong further complicates
the copyright suit.276  Specifically, the mutual intent prong does not ade-
quately protect collaborators like dramaturgs because it reinforces the status
quo of the playwright's sole authorship status ii the world of theater. 277 As
a result of these intervening factors, artists will have less control in fashion-
ing their arguments in a copyright suit.
The copyright lawsuit is also more costly than a contract dispute. In a
copyright action, there is a greater likelihood that the production itself will
be enjoined.278 Courts issue preliminary injunctions in copyright suits "far
more routinely in such cases than in other sorts of disputes."279 This shifts a
significant cost to the viewing public because it can no longer enjoy the work
in the event that a court issues such an injunction.
Contract disputes, on the other hand, are less cost prohibitive because
collaborative agreements often contain provisions requiring arbitration,
which is not as expensive as litigation.280 Unlike litigation, arbitration does
not endanger the public interest because injunctions in this context are not
often used.281 For example, the Dramatist Guild's 282 Basic Production Con-
tract for Plays ("Basic Production Contract") contains a provision that obli-
gates the parties to arbitrate contract disputes.283 If the collaborators disa-
gree on royalty apportionment, for example, the Dramatist Guild steps in to
arbitrate and determine the allocation of interests, as opposed to enjoining
the project's production. 2 4 "The Guild does this to avoid the wasted energy
which occurs when co-authors disagree, jeopardizing the continuation and
completion of the work., 285 Before any dispute arises, artists typically agree
276. See supra Part IV.A.2.
277. Id.
278. See GORMAN & GINSBURG, supra note 35, at 652.
279. Id. at 652; see generally Erickson v. Trinity Theater, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061 (7th Cir. 1994)
(granting a preliminary injunction temporarily enjoining a play's production); Cabrera v. Teatro
Del Sesenta, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 743 (P.R. 1995) (awarding the plaintiff a temporary restraining
order against the theater, which the court lifted before opening night, but the defendants agreed to
halt the production until the case was resolved).
280. As an alternative to filing a law suit, the arbitration process is less formal and time con-
suming and thus less expensive than litigation. EDWARD J. MURPHY & RICHARD E. SPEIDEL,
STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1261 (4th ed. 1991).
281. See Keller, supra note 41, at 935.
282. The Dramatist Guild is a professional association of playwrights, librettists, composers,
and lyricists. See Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195, 206 (2d Cir. 1998).
283. DRAMATIST GUILD, APPROVED PRODUCTION CONTRACT FOR PLAYS, art. XX, at 37
[hereinafter DG Production Contract] (providing that any "claim, dispute, or controversy arising
between Producer and Author ... shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the terms of this
Article.") (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
284. See Keller, supra note 41, at 935.
285. See id.
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to arbitrate any potential disputes. 86  Realizing that automatic arbitration
with an attendant fee will be resorted to, the collaborators have an incentive
to come to an agreement on their own.21
7
Another attribute of arbitration suitable to theater is the fact that arbi-
trators have expertise in the context in which the dispute arises.288 For in-
stance, the Dramatist Guild provides an expert such as a lyricist or com-
poser to determine the relative contributions and credit. 89 This process can
lead to a more efficient result compared to a judge who may not be familiar
with the specific collaboration process at hand.290
Another strength of contract law is the fact that, unlike copyright law,
it can be tailor-made to theater. This characteristic is essential to a collabo-
rative art such as theater. Commercial theaters have standardized the allo-
cation of royalties and rights to authors. 29 1 The Minimum Basic Production
Contract for works produced on Broadway, for instance, provides model
provisions for professional theaters in the United States. 2  Moreover, the
Dramatist Guild's definition of "author" is more suitable to theater com-
pared to case law's definition.293 In fact, the Dramatist Guild's definition
recognizes those persons who are "involved in the initial stages of a collabo-
rative process . . .. 294
In addition, trade usage of particular terms or arrangements are helpful
in contract law disputes.295 In the event of a contract dispute, trade usage
can facilitate the interpretation of any ambiguities in the contract.296 As an
illustration, the renowned playwright of Angels in America, Tony Kushner,
gave fifteen percent of the show's royalties to the two dramaturgs who
helped him write the final version. 7 In doing so, Kushner acknowledged
286. MURPHY & SPEIDEL, supra note 280, at 1261.
287. Keller, supra note 41, at 935.
288. MURPHY & SPEIDEL, supra note 280, at 1263.
289. Keller, supra note 41, at 935.
290. See generally MURPHY & SPEIDEL, supra note 280, at 1263 ("[Alrbitration is a form of
consensual, relatively informal, personalized adjudication .... The challenge is to obtain particu-
larized justice in an extra-legal adjudicatory process which has potential strengths and weaknesses
compared to civil litigation.").
291. Keller, supra note 41, at 912; see also DG PRODUCTION CONTRACT, supra note 283,
art. IV, at 5-7.
292. Keller, supra note 41, at 912.
293. DG PRODUCTION CONTRACT, supra note 283, art. I, at 2.
294. Id.
295. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 222.
296. Id. § 222(3) ("[A] usage of trade in the vocation... or a usage of trade which [the par-
ties] know or have reason to know gives meaning to or supplements or qualifies their agreement.").
297. Pressley, supra note 18, at D2.
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that such assignments are typical in the industry.298 Thus, even if certain
artists do not meet copyright law's requirements for joint authorship, they
may still share in the profits of the work through contract law.
As a result of Thomson v. Larson, Literary Managers and Dramaturgs
of America is busily drafting sample contracts for their members to refer to
before the members agree to help develop a project.29 These sample con-
tracts are important, especially given that the Dramatist Guild's definition of
"author," although broad, does not explicitly refer to dramaturgs.3 ° One
lawyer from Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts3'1 urges artists to use guild
model contracts and contract law to protect themselves because it is often
impossible for artists to afford lawyers, unless they have already achieved
financial success.30 2
V. CONCLUSION
To summarize, under the Childress test, dramaturgs cannot acquire
joint authorship status, because they often do not contribute independently
copyrightable material. More importantly, given the exclusive status that
playwrights exalt in the theater industry, dramaturgs will have difficulty
proving that playwrights intended for them to be joint authors. Compared to
copyright law, contract law and collaborative agreements more adequately
protect the dramaturg. Copyright law, for instance, measures creation in the
traditional sense by focusing on intent at the particular time the writing is
done. Copyright law also does not include in its definition of "author," those
collaborators who contribute substantial material that is not fixed. There-
fore, collaborators need to memorialize credit, authorship, and remuneration
in writing beforehand. Signing a collaboration agreement is especially im-
portant with new play development where creative relationships are uniquely
collaborative. 03 Collaborators may object to these agreements because they
298. Id. The author of Chorus Line recognized the dancers' contributions by apportioning
the royalties. See Stuart, supra note 17, at C16.
299. Solomon, supra note 222, at 83.
300. DG PRODUCTION CONTRACT, supra note 283, art. I, at 2 (explaining that "[tihe term
author' shall include any person who is involved in the initial stages of a collaborative process and
who is deserving of billing credit as an Author and whose literary or musical contribution will be
an integral part of the [pllay as presented in subsequent productions by other producers.").
301. This is a non-profit organization dedicated to assisting struggling artists involved in legal
disputes. See Carol J. Steinberg, How Not to Need a Lawyer Written Collaboration Agreements,
BACKSTAGE, Apr. 22, 1994 at 13.
302. Id. at 13, 47. There is a presumption that joint owners share equally; such a presump-
tion can be altered by contract. id. at 47. One can also spell out who owns the copyright, what
credit would be given, and how disputes will be resolved. Id.
303. Telephone Interview with Mandy Mishelle, supra note 14.
1998]
106 LOYOLA OF LOSANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 19
claim that these agreements stymie the creative, free-flowing discussion es-
sential to developing new works. However, signing a collaborative agree-
ment will better ensure that the curtain will still go up in the unfortunate
event that the collaborators resort to copyright law in order to determine
where money and ownership status go.
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